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Abstract—To reap the benefits of the Internet of Things (IoT),
it is imperative to secure the system against cyber attacks in
order to enable mission critical and real-time applications. To
this end, intrusion detection systems (IDSs) have been widely
used to detect anomalies caused by a cyber attacker in IoT
systems. However, due to the large-scale nature of the IoT, an IDS
must operate in a distributed manner with minimum dependence
on a central controller. Moreover, in many scenarios such as
health and financial applications, the datasets are private and
IoTDs may not intend to share such data. To this end, in this
paper, a distributed generative adversarial network (GAN) is
proposed to provide a fully distributed IDS for the IoT so as to
detect anomalous behavior without reliance on any centralized
controller. In this architecture, every IoTD can monitor its own
data as well as neighbor IoTDs to detect internal and external
attacks. In addition, the proposed distributed IDS does not
require sharing the datasets between the IoTDs, thus, it can
be implemented in IoTs that preserve the privacy of user data
such as health monitoring systems or financial applications. It is
shown analytically that the proposed distributed GAN has higher
accuracy of detecting intrusion compared to a standalone IDS
that has access to only a single IoTD dataset. Simulation results
show that, the proposed distributed GAN-based IDS has up to
20% higher accuracy, 25% higher precision, and 60% lower false
positive rate compared to a standalone GAN-based IDS.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Internet of Things (IoT) will interconnect a plethora
of devices that collect data from their environment, process
such data, and transmit valuable information to end-user
applications such as health monitoring systems, drone delivery
systems, self driving cars, and smart grids [1]–[5]. However, an
effective deployment of these diverse IoT services requires an
efficient intrusion detection system (IDS) that assures secure
and reliable data transmission from IoT devices (IoTDs) by
detecting anomalous activities such as sending data which is
different from their normal state [5].
The use of IDS solutions has been studied extensively in
IoT networks [6]–[13]. For instance, the works in [6] and
[7] proposed signature-based methods in which the network
behavior is compared with a set of attack signatures which
is stored in a database. Moreover, the authors in [8]–[10]
have proposed anomaly-based IDSs in which the activities of
a network are compared to the normal behavior of the system
and an alarm is triggered whenever the deviation from the
normal state exceeds a threshold. Furthermore, new techniques
are proposed in [11]–[13] to compare the state of the system
with predefined specifications such as the maximum capacity
of links, packet size, or abstract rules based on IoT traffic.
However, due to several unique characteristics of IoT
systems such as their scale and privacy-preserving nature,
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traditional IDSs such as those proposed in [6]–[13] may not
be effective. In traditional methods, the system administrator
implements the IDS on computationally capable data centers
or nodes that process the data from the entire IoT system
or from a subset of neighboring nodes. However, due to the
large-scale nature of the IoT, relying on centralized nodes to
deploy IDS solutions exposes such nodes to attacks and, thus,
eventually the rest of the IoT can also be vulnerable if the
centralized IDS is compromised [14]. In addition, most IDSs
require the availability of large amounts of data points related
to the normal state of the network and failure scenarios [6]–
[13]. However, in IoT systems, each IoTD may have a dataset
that only contains a limited portion of the network’s state.
Moreover, in many applications such as health monitoring
systems or financial activities, the end user may not intend to
share its available dataset with the administrator of the system
which makes the data-centered IDS solutions ineffective [5].
Recently, a number of distributed IDS and attack detection
methods have been proposed for improving IoT security in
[15]–[20]. The authors in [15] and [16] proposed anomaly de-
tection approaches in which every node monitors its neighbors
and, in case of abnormal behavior of a neighbor, breaks the
data link from that neighbor. The authors in [17] presented the
challenges related to distributed private datasets and cloud-
centric IoT systems. The works in [18] and [19] developed
distributed deep learning algorithms for cyber attack detection
in fog-to-things systems. In [20], a clustering method has been
proposed that combines the measurements of IoTDs before
sending a compact description of their data to other nodes
so as to minimize the communication overhead. However, the
proposed IDSs in [6]–[13] are centralized and not applicable
for large scale IoT systems. In addition, the distributed IDS
methods in [15]–[20] cannot be applied to IoTDs that seek to
preserve the privacy of their data.
The main contribution of this paper is, thus, to propose a
distributed generative adversarial network (GAN) architecture
as an IDS for IoT systems. Recently, GANs emerged as an ef-
fective unsupervised anomaly detection approach in computer
vision and time series applications [21]–[26]. However, these
computer vision and time-series works consider a centralized
GAN that has access to all of the data points. In contrast,
in an IoT, a centralized GAN may cause communication
overhead and increase the vulnerability of the IoT to the
attacks on central units. The proposed distributed GAN-based
IDS enables the IoTDs to monitor their neighbors in order
to detect intrusion with minimum dependence on a central
unit. In particular, the proposed distributed IDS can detect
any type of attack that manipulates the integrity of the IoTDs
such as bad data injection attacks. Moreover, we analytically
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show the superiority of the proposed distributed GAN-based
IDS in terms of accuracy and intrusion detection probability
compared to a single standalone GAN IDS. Simulation results
show that, for a daily activity dataset [27], the proposed
distributed GAN-based IDS has up to 20% higher accuracy,
25% higher precision, and 60% lower false positive rate
compared to a standalone GAN-based IDS. To the best of our
knowledge, this paper is the first to propose a distributed GAN
architecture as an IDS in privacy preserving IoT systems.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The IoT
system model and GAN architecture are presented in Section
II. The proposed distributed GAN-based IDS is described in
Section III. The simulation results are studied in Section IV
and conclusions are drawn in V.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Consider an IoT system composed of a set N of n IoTDs in
which each IoTD i owns a set of its previously transmitted data
points,Di, that follows a distribution pdatai(x), where x can be
time series, financial records, or health monitoring datasets
depending on the IoT application. We consider Di contains
data points from the normal state of the IoTD in which there
is no intrusion to the IoT. We also let D1∪D2∪· · ·∪Dn = D,
where D is the total available data with a distribution pdata. In
this model, every IoTD i tries to learn a generator distribution
pgi over its available dataset Di such that pgi = pdatai and
use that distribution to detect an intrusion to the system. The
intrusion in our system is any activity by an attacker that
causes an IoTD to communicate data points which do not
follow its data distribution pdi . In fact, if an IoTD knows the
distribution of its own normal state, it can easily discriminate
a data point that is not similar to the normal state distribution.
To learn the distribution pgi at every IoTD i, we define a
prior input noise z with distribution pzi(z) and a mapping
Gi(z,θgi) from this random variable z to data space, where
Gi is an artificial neural network (ANN) with parameters θgi .
An ANN, usually, consists of artificial neurons and activation
functions which map an input to an output. We define another
ANN called discriminator Di(x,θdi) for every IoTD i that
receives a data point x and outputs a value between 0 and 1.
When the output of the discriminator is closer to 1, then the
received data point is a normal state and when the output is
closer to 0 then the received data is an anomaly at IoTD i.
Every IoTD i’s generator ANN tries to generate data points
close to the normal state data in order to find the best approxi-
mation of pdatai . On the other hand, every IoTD’s discriminator
aims at discriminating the generated data points from its own
dataset. In fact, the generated data points mimic anomalous
state of the system because they are generated from a distri-
bution pgi that is not equal to pdatai , because θgi are randomly
chosen for an untrained ANN. Thus, the discriminator outputs
0 values for the generator [28]. Therefore, the generator
and discriminator at every IoTD i interact to find the the
optimal θgi and θdi such that the generator can generate data
points close to the normal state while the discriminator can
discriminate between the abnormal (anomalous) and normal
data points. This interaction can be modeled using a game-
theoretic framework [28] in which we define a local value
function at every IoTD i as follows:
Vi(Di, Gi) = Ex∼pdata [logDi(x)]
+ Ez∼pzi log (1−Di(Gi(z))) . (1)
The value function (1), jointly quantifies how close is the
generator’s generated data points to the normal state and
how good the discriminator can discriminate between the
normal and abnormal data points. In (1), the first term is
defined to force the discriminator to produce values equal to
1 for real data. Meanwhile, the second term penalizes any
anomalous point generated by the generators. While every
IoTD’s generator will seek to minimize the value function
defined in (1), the discriminator tries to maximize this value.
Therefore, the optimal solutions for the discriminator and
generator can be derived from the following minimax problem
[28]:
{D∗i , G∗i } = arg min
Gi
arg max
Di
Vi(Di, Gi). (2)
However, since every IoTD has access to only its own dataset,
the optimization problem for a standalone IDS in which every
IoTD has access only to its own dataset:
{D¯i, G¯i} = arg min
Gi
arg max
Di
V¯i(Di, Gi), (3)
where
V¯i(Di, Gi) = Ex∼pdatai [logDi(x)]
+ Ez∼pzi log (1−Di(Gi(z))) . (4)
Next, we show that a standalone IDS cannot optimally detect
intrusion. To this end, first, we derive the optimal value of a
standalone IDS.
Theorem 1. The optimal value for a standalone IDS will be:
Vi(D¯i, G¯i) = − log(4) + s(pdatai ||pdata), (5)
where s is the Jensen-Shanon divergence between distributions
pdatai and pdata.
Proof. To find the optimal strategies of the generator and
discriminator of a standalone IoTD we have to solve (3).
From [28, Theorem 1] we know that the solution of (3) is
at p¯gi = pdatai . Now from (1) we have:
Vi(D¯i, G¯i) =
∫
x
pdata(x) log D¯i(x)dx
+
∫
z
pzi(z) log
(
1− D¯i
(
G¯i (z)
))
dz
=
∫
x
(
pdata(x) log D¯i(x)
+ p¯gi(x) log
(
1− D¯i (x)
) )
dx. (6)
For any pg¯i , (6) reaches its minimum at D¯i =
pdata
pdata+p¯gi
. Since
we know the standalone IoTD reaches its optimal point at
p¯gi = pdatai , then we will have:
Vi(D¯i, G¯i) =
∫
x
(
pdata(x) log
(
pdata(x)
pdata(x) + pdatai(x)
)
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Fig. 1: An illustration of the system model in training and intrusion detection phases.
+ pdatai(x) log
(
pdatai(x)
pdata(x) + pdatai(x)
))
dx
=
∫
x
(
pdata(x) log
(
pdata(x)
2
pdata(x)+pdatai (x)
2
)
+ pdatai(x) log
(
pdatai(x)
2
pdata(x)+pdatai (x)
2
))
dx
=
∫
x
(
pdata(x)
(
log
(
pdata(x)
pdata(x)+pdatai (x)
2
)
+ log(1/2)
)
+ pdatai(x)
(
log
(
pdatai(x)
pdata(x)+pdatai (x)
2
)
+ log(1/2)
))
dx, (7)
which simplifies to (5). 
From [28, Theorem 1] we know that the optimal value for
a centralized IDS which has access to all of the data points
is − log(4). Thus, from Theorem 1, we can derive that the
standalone IDS cannot minimize the value function as good
as a centralized IDS that is connected to all the data points
since the optimal value of a standalone IDS is larger than
that of a centralized IDS by a value of s(pdatai ||pdata). Next,
we also show that the true positive rate, TP , i.e. correctly
detected anomaly rate, of an standalone IDS is always less
than a centralized IDS that has access to all of the data points.
Proposition 1. The TP of a standalone IoTD anomaly detector
is always less than an IoTD that has access to all of the data
points.
Proof. From [28, Proposition 1], we know that the optimal
discriminator of a centralized IDS that has access to the full
dataset is D∗(x) = 12 , ∀x ∈ pdata. Therefore, the difference
between the discriminator of the standalone IoTD, pdatapdata+p¯gi
,
and the discriminator of a GAN with the full data, 1/2,
shows the error of the standalone IoTD. Thus, the TP of the
standalone IoT is complement of such error as follows:
TPi = E
1−
∣∣∣∣∣∣
1/2− pdata(x)pdatai (x)+pdata(x)
1/2
∣∣∣∣∣∣
 , (8)
where (8) reaches its maximum when pdatai(x) = pdata(x),
which contradicts with the fact that pdatai(x) 6= pdata(x).
Therefore true positive ratio of an standalone IoTD is smaller
than the IoT that has access to all data points. 
Although the standalone GAN may be able to detect internal
intrusions, i.e., the IoTD can detect if an adversary has manip-
ulated its own data, however, an attacker can also manipulate
the IDS itself to stay stealthy at the attacked IoTD. One
approach to stop the attacker from staying stealthy in internal
intrusions can be to implement a centralized IDS that monitors
all of the IoTDs. However, in this approach the communication
overhead can be extremely high due to the large-scale nature of
the IoT system. Moreover, in this case, the central IDS should
have access to all of the IoTDs’ datasets which may not be
practical in a privacy preserving IoT system. Furthermore, a
centralized IDS makes the IoT system vulnerable to attacks on
the central unit. Therefore, next, we propose a novel distributed
GAN architecture that provides an effective IDS by adapting a
mechanism in which every IoTD monitors the neighbor IoTDs.
III. DISTRIBUTED GAN-BASED IDS FOR IOT SYSTEMS
In our proposed distributed GAN-based IDS, we build on
the architecture from [29]. The goal of our distributed GAN
is to find a discriminator at every IoTD without sharing their
datasets with each other such that every IoTD’s discriminator
can discriminate if a new data point follows the total data
distribution, pdata. The main difference of the distributed IDS
with the standalone IDS is that the standalone IDS learns
to compare a new data point with its own data distribution,
pdatai , however, in the proposed distributed IDS, every IoTD
can compare a new data point with the distribution of the
total data pdata. Therefore, since in the distributed IDS every
IoTD’s discriminator knows the distribution of the total data,
then every IoTD can detect intrusion on other IoTDs as well.
In our distributed GAN, during only the training phase, we
use a central unit that has a generator Gφ where φ is the
weights of the generator’s ANN. Furthermore, every IoTD
only has a discriminator denoted by Dθi where θi is the
weights of every discriminator’s ANN. In this architecture,
every IoTD is connected to at least one other IoTD in a
wireless network such that the connection graph of the IoTDs
must construct a cycle. Moreover, at the training phase, every
IoTD is connected to the central unit. We define T as the
period of epochs at which IoTDs communicate with the
center and E as the period of epochs at which the IoTDs
communicate with each other. An epoch is a training session
during which all of the data points have been used to update
the ANN weights. Next, we explain the training phase for the
distributed GAN-based IDS architecture as shown in Fig. 1.
A. Training of the Discriminators
Every T epochs, for a fixed φ, the generator generates 2n
batches {Ba1 , . . . ,Ban ,Bg1 , . . . ,Bgn} of b anomalous points,
i.e. fake points that are not derived from the actual datasets.
Moreover, the discriminator at each IoTD i samples a batch
Bri of b points from its available dataset Di. The generator
sends every generated batch Bai to each IoTD i which, in turn,
calculates the following loss value:
Li(θi) =
1
b
 ∑
x∈Bri
logDθi(x) +
∑
x∈Bai
log (1−Dθi(x))
 .
(9)
Li(θi) characterizes an approximation of the value function
for each IoTD’s discriminator in (1). Then using a gradient
descent method such as the Adam optimizer [30], the IoTD
updates its own weights, θi.
B. Training of the Central Generator
Every T epochs, every IoTD i uses Bgi to calculate the
following loss:
Lgi (θi) =
1
b
 ∑
x∈Bgi
log (1−Dθi(x))
 , (10)
which is an approximation of the value function for each
IoTD’s generator in (1). Note that, in [28], it has been
shown that for practical implementation the generator’s loss
should not include the = 1b
[∑
x∈Bri logDθi(x)
]
term since
discriminator usually converges faster than the generator. Next,
every IoTD sends this value to the center. Then, the center uses
the received loss values from IoTDs to calculate its average
loss:
Lg(φ) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
Lgi (θi). (11)
Then, the center applies a gradient descent method on the
generator to update its weight by minimizing Lg(φ).
C. Discriminator Weight Swapping
Every E epochs, every IoTD sends its discriminator’s
weights θi to the neighbor IoTD and receives the discriminator
weights of another IoTD. Note that, as mentioned before, the
connection graph should include a cycle covering all of the
IoTDs. This helps IoTDs to receive the discriminator weights
of all of the other IoTDs, eventually. This phase enables
the the system to preserve privacy during training because
the IoTDs do not share their data but, instead, they share
the weights of their discriminators. Using this approach, the
generator receives the loss value from all of the discriminators.
Moreover, every IoTD’s discriminator will be trained on all
of the datasets. Therefore, for enough training epochs, the
central generator will converge to the distribution of the total
dataset D. In addition, the discriminators of the IoTDs will
be similar to a GAN discriminator that has access to the total
dataset. Thus, in the distributed GAN architecture, each IoTD’s
discriminator can detect intrusion on its own data as well as
neighbor IoTDs.
D. Intrusion Detection Phase
After the convergence of the distributed GAN, there will
be no need for the central unit as all of the discriminators
at IoTDs can detect the intrusion to the system. Thus, every
IoTD IoTD will run its observed real-time data through its own
discriminator as well as one of it’s neighbor’s discriminator.
As shown in Proposition 1, the optimal discriminator will
output 1/2 for a normal state data point. Therefore, to detect
an intrusion to the system, the output of the discriminator can
be compared to 1/2 and if the output is close to 1/2, the IoTD
will be in a normal state. However, if the output is closer to 0
or 1 the IoTD will be under attack. This approach helps the IoT
system to detect an intrusion to the system without dependence
on a central unit since every IoTD can also check its neighbor’s
data. The intrusion detection phase of the proposed distributed
GAN-based IDS is shown in Fig. 1.
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS
For our simulations, we use a daily activity recognition
dataset [27] that is collected from 30 subjects with different
genders, ages, heights, and weights using a smartphone. We
use this dataset since it can be a good example of health
datasets that are collected by wearable IoTDs. Such health
datasets are private to their owners and, thus, the owners
may not intend to share them. The collected data is for 12
activities as follows: walking forward, walking left, walking
right, walking upstairs, walking downstairs, running forward,
jumping, sitting, standing, sleeping, elevator up, and elevator
down. The dataset contains 2,365 recordings in total and every
recording in this dataset has 561 frequency and time domain
features. We split this dataset into training and test datasets
with a 4 to 1 ratio.
We consider three IDSs: a standalone GAN that has access
only to its own dataset, a centralized GAN that has access to
all datasets, and the proposed distributed GAN. We use ANN
architectures similar to the ones in [28]. To train the ANNs we
use the Tensorflow library, a single NVIDIA P100 GPU, and
20 Gigabits of memory. We train the ANNs on the training
datasets and stop the training after 5,000 epochs. To model the
intrusion, we consider an attacker who can inject false data to
the features of the training dataset. We consider 10 scenarios
with different attack-to-signal power ratios in which a random
Gaussian noise is added to every feature of the training data
points. In addition, we consider an internal attack detection in
which every IoTD checks its own data and an external attack
detection in which every IoTD checks its neighbor IoTDs.
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Fig. 2: Average discriminator output VS training epochs
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Fig. 3: Accuracy of IDSs VS attack to signal power ratio.
Fig. 2 shows the output of the discriminator during the
training phase. We can see from 2a that the proposed IDS
reaches the optimal discriminator value which is 0.5 after
convergence. However, the standalone and central IDSs reach
values different from the optimal points. A standalone IDS
has a non optimal discriminator output because it does not
have access to the complete data. In addition, the central
IDS also cannot reach the optimal discriminator since having
access to all data points results in overfitting the ANN. As
we can see from Fig. 2a the central IDS’s discriminator starts
increasing around epoch 1000 after getting close to the optimal
discriminator value. Such behavior of the central approach
is aligned with the GAN-centric results of in [29]. Also
Fig. 2b shows that the proposed distributed IDS reaches the
optimal discriminator even for the test dataset, although such
dataset has not been used in the training. This shows that,
the discriminators of the distributed GANs are successful in
approximating the total dataset and can discriminate even the
unseen data points.
Fig. 3 compares the accuracy of three IDSs against in-
ternal and external attacks. The accuracy is calculated as
TP+TN
TP+TN+FP+FN
, where TP is the true positive or the correctly
detected anomaly ratio, FP is the false positive or the falsely
detected anomaly ratio, TN is the true negative or the correctly
assigned normal ratio, and FN is the false negative or the
falsely assigned normal ratio. Fig. 3 shows that the proposed
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Fig. 4: Precision of IDSs VS attack to signal power ratio.
distributed IDS outperforms both of the central and standalone
IDSs by up to 15% and 20% in terms of accuracy, respectively,
for both the internal and external attacks. Note that the internal
and external attacks for a central IDS are the same since there
is just one central unit that discriminates the IoTD data points.
Fig. 4 shows the precision of the three IDSs against internal
and external attacks with different attack to signal ratios.
In IDSs, precision is calculated as TPTP+FP and a precision
score of 1.0 means that every datapoint labeled as intrusion
is indeed an intrusion. We can see from Fig. 4 that the
proposed distributed IDS has up to 25% and 20% higher
precision compared to the standalone IDS and the central IDS,
respectively. This means that the proposed distributed IDS has
higher confidence of detecting intrusion to the IoT.
Fig. 5 shows the false positive rate of the IDSs which is
calculated as FPFP+TN . In IDSs, a false positive rate is the
ratio between the number of normal state data points wrongly
categorized as intursion (FP ) and the total number of actual
normal state data points (FP + TN ). Note that, since FP and
TN are calculated from the evaluation of normal data points,
the power ratio of the attack will not affect the false positive
rate. We can see from Fig. 5 that the proposed distributed IDS
has significantly less false positive rate than the standalone
and central IDSs. In addition, both distributed and standalone
IDSs have slightly lower false positive rate for internal attacks
compared to external attacks.
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Fig. 5: False positive ratio of IDSs.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have proposed a distributed GAN-based
IDS solution that can detect intrusion to the IoT with minimum
dependence on a central unit. In this architecture, every IoTD
can monitor its own data as well as neighbor IoTDs to detect
internal and external attacks. In addition, the proposed dis-
tributed IDS does not require sharing the datasets between the
IoTDs, thus, it is practical to implement in IoTs that preserve
the privacy of user data such as health monitoring systems
or financial applications. We have shown analytically that the
proposed distributed IDS can outperform a standalone IDS
that has access only to the dataset of a single IDS. Simulation
results that use a real-world a daily activity recognition dataset
show that the proposed distributed GAN-based IDS has up tp
20% higher accuracy, 25% higher precision, and 60% lower
false positive rate compared to a standalone IDS.
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